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TheProblem of Control
of :!Instalment Credit
THE analysis in the preceding chapters has shown that in the
past. consumer instalment credit has operated to accentuate
economic fluctuations. It tends to reinforce expansionary
whether they constitute the upswing of a normal
busiiness cycle or are due to a special inflationary stimulus
like the present war boom; similarly it tends to intensify
dep:cessions of cyclical or other nature. The foregoing dii-
cussion has shown too that this behavior has been due not
to an ephemeral constellation of circumstances, but to
that are deeply rooted in traits of human behavior and
in the basic structure and practices of our credit institutions,
facts that cannot be assumed to change readily. Hence there
is every reason to believe that also in the future instalment
credit will tend to reinforce fluctuations in business activity,
unless effective measures are taken to control its move-
ments.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The cyclical pattern is not a special attribute of consumer
instalment credit. All types of credit display essentially the
sani.e cyclical behavior. Hence such behavior should not be
taken as a sufficient basis for a condemnation of the institu-
tion of instalment credit. So long as this type of credit ex-
hibits an upward movement it raises the level of consumer
expenditure, and thus exerts a stimulating influence which
is quite welcome if it occurs during an acute cyclical de-
pression or a stagnation period with much unemployment
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and other underutilized resources. The same is true even
after the upward movement of outstanding credit has come
to an end, provided it can be assumed that the operation of
instalment credit tends, over the cycle as a whole, to reduce
the propensity to save. As we have seen, there are reasons
to believe that this is the case to some extent.
Moreover, in judging the institution of instalment credit
it must not be overlooked that it performs important social
functions. By introducing an element of flexibility and ad-
justability into the budget of lower-income families it helps
to overcome temporary emergencies; and given the fact that
many persons lack the will power to save first and buy for
cash afterward, it permits a change in consumer demand
in favor of high-priced durable -goods which; on the whole,
may perhaps be characterized as desirable. On the other
hand, the high cost of instalment credit, especially when
extended in small amounts, must be regarded as socially dis-
advantageous; and it cannot be overlooked that instalment
selling probably induces many persons to make purchases of
expensive things which they later regret having bought.
But whatever the final verdict in all these respects may
be, it can hardly be denied th.at, assuming no change in the
long-run volume of credit or in its long-run trend (if there
is any), economic stability would be promoted if cyclical
fluctuations in instalment credit outstandings were less vio-
lent or, still better, if they were anticyclical instead of cycli-
cal. Thus the question arises whether it is not possible to
devise measures of control calculated to bring about such
a reduction or reversal in the cyclical fluctuations of credit.
Much has been written on possible control measures and,
as can be seen from the descriptive monographs in this series,
some branches of instalment credit have been subjected to
extensive legislative and administrative restrictions and con-
trols, varying considerably among the different states of the
Union. But the problem of control was not discussed sys-
tematically from the point of view of reducing economici6o ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
fluctuations before the appearance of Roif Nugent's im-
portant book.1
It is not particularly difficult to think of measures that
would prevent or retard the development of instalment
credit, and thus it should be easy to bring about an institu-
tional contraction. Moreover, by relaxing or removing such
restrictive measures an institutional expansion could be
brought about; positive measures of stimulation could even
be adopted, although, as in other types of credit, control
measures are more effective and reliable in restricting than
in expanding. Thus, within certain limits in the upward
direction, the long-run volume of credit can be effectively
brought under control.
The regulative measures that have actually been applied
are described in the various institutional monographs of this
series. They consist mainly of provisions concerning licensing
and regulations about maximum charges, maximum amounts
of individual loans and other lending practices. Their pur-
pose has been to protect debtor and creditor from abuses
and to prevent unwise borrowing; they have not been de-
signed to promote economic stability. For the most part,
however, they are capable of influencing the volume of credit,
mainly in its long-run movement but conceivably also in
its short-run fluctuations.
It might be thought that the restrictive measures by which
the legislator seeks to protect the borrower have tended
to reduce the volume of credit in the long run, because these
measures forbid many contracts that otherwise would have
been made. Many experts believe, however, that policies of
regulation, standardization and control which appear prima
facie to be restrictive have actually brought about an in-
crease in the volume of credit in the long run, because
1ConsumerCredit and Economic Stability (New York 1939). J. E. Meade's
Consumers' Credit and Unemployment (Oxford 1938) is no exception, because
it really deals with another subject. Meade means by consumer credit gov-
ernment subsidies to consumers rather than credit extended by private insti-
tutions on a commercial basis. He proposes to put money into the hands of
the consumers during depression periods, and to withdraw it in boom times,
so as to counteract cyclical fluctuations.CONTROL OF CREDIT i6i
they have prevented abuses and forestalled unfavorable reac-
tions that otherwise would have occurred.2 Undoubtedly
there are control measures that have decreased the volume
of credit (for example, too low minimum rates of charge
for small loans in some states), and it would be easy to restrict
volume effectively, but there are no grounds for believing
that the regulative measures that have been adopted have
systematically either intensified or damped the amplitude of
cyclical fluctuations in credit.
We shall now discuss possible methods of credit expansion
or contraction in the interest of economic stability, and
shall then consider the probable effectiveness of such policies
in various circumstances.
METHODS OF CREDIT CONTROL
We may distinguish between measures influencing the sup-
ply of credit and those affecting the demand for it. As in
other credit fields, supply is more amenable to influence than
demand. Two different problems of supply should be dis-
tinguished: first, the supply of funds to the institutions of
instalment credit; and second, the supply of funds to the
final consumer-borrower.
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that instalment credit in-
stitutions have gained easy access to the money market at
large, in periods of prosperity as well as in periods of de-
pression. Accordingly, the general policy of the monetary
authorities with respect to the short-term credit market, de-
signed either to expand or to contract the supply of loanable
funds, to reduce or to raise interest rates, will affect instal-
ment credit institutions in the same way as it does the market
at large, that is to say, the rate that these agencies have
to pay for borrowed funds will vary with the market rates.
But interest cost on borrowed funds is a small and unim-
21t must not be forgotten that consumer credit is not a perfectly competitive
industry. And under monopolistic conditions even the fixing of a price below
the uninfluenced level may easily result in an expansion of the volume of
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portant element in the total costs of instalment credit in-
stitutions, and a still smaller proportion of the total finance
charge to the consumer-borrower.3 Itissafe to say that
changes in the lending institutions' interest cost for bor-
rowed funds are a negligible factor in the determination
of the volume of instalment credit, irrespective of whether
or not such changes are completely passed on to the consumer
by raising or lowering the finance charge; and they would
still be a negligible factor even if they were of a much
greater order of magnitude than those that usually occur
during trade cycles. It follows that a raising or lowering of
the short-term or long-term rate of interest, which is the
classical method of central banking policy, is of no avail
for controlling the volume of instalment credit.
It is true that a rise in the volume of instalment credit
could be checked or a contraction brought about by more
drastic "qualitative," "selective" or "discriminatory" meth-
ods of credit policy. The banking system could conceivably
charge high and discriminatory rates or could introduce
credit rationing, that is, set a limit on funds for instalment
credit institutions by fixing quotas (maximum credit lines)
for individual agencies. But such a policy would be difficult
to carry out. The great number of banks and of consumer
credit institutions, the variety of sources from which the
latter can draw funds, the great differences as to the availa-
bility of these sources to the different institutions, would
make it very hard to execute a policy of credit rationing in
an equitable manner.
It seems to be more feasible to control the flow of instal-
ment credit at the terminal faucet where funds enter the
household of the final consumer. This is the method chosen
by the policy of restriction inaugurated by the Executive
In Chapter 4 it was argued that changes of a few percent in the interest
equivalent of the total finance charge paid by the consumer may be regarded
as an unimportant factor as compared with changes in contract length and
down payment percentage. This isstill more true of changes in the small
fraction of the finance charge (interest to the credit institution) with which
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Order concerning consumer credit, issued by President Roose-
velt on August 9, 1941, and administered by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Under this policy
it is not through regulation of the finance charge that credit
is controlled,4 but through regulation of down payment per-
centages and contract lengths. It may be remarked at once
that these control measures, although introduced for coping
with the present emergency, can also be utilized for purposes
of controlling peacetime cyclical fluctuations in credit.
The first regulation issued by the Board pursuant to the
Executive Order is known as Regulation W, and was adopted
August 21, 1941. Regulation W, amended as of April 1,
prescribes a minimum down payment as follows: 331/3
percent of the cash purchase price in sales of automobiles
and motorcycles (this may include the value of a trade-in);
331/3 percent of the "basis price" (cash purchase price minus
trade-in allowance) in sales of new or used aircraft, motor
boats, outboard motors, bicycles, radios, metallic musical
instruments, cameras and various household appliances; 10
or 20 percent of the basis price in sales of stoves and heating
units, clocks, pumps, plumbing fixtures, furniture and floor
coverings. For most of these commodities a maximum ma-
turity of 15 months is stipulated.
The same rules apply, in the amended regulation, to in-
stalment cash loans of $1500 or less, if they are used for the
purchase of any of the listed articles, whether or riot they
are secured by the article purchased; and the maturity of
'A contraction of credit might be brought about by enforcing a low as well
as a very high rate of finance charge: a sufficiently low rate would discourage
supply because of the high operating cost of consumer lending, and a suffi-
ciently high rate would choke off demand. But any policy of regulating credit
through a control of finance charges would be extremely complex and dif-
ficult, because of the great variety of rate quotations and the wide range
of actual rate levels for different types of credit, due to profound differences
in operating conditions. The history of credit control offers many examples
of maximum rate regulations, but none of minimum rates. In consumer in-
stalment financing the existent maximum legal rates have been imposed not
for the purpose of regulating credit volume in the interest of economic sta-
bility, but in order to protect the borrower from exploitation.
The full texts of the Executive Order and Regulation W, amended as of
April 1, 1942, are presented in Appendix C.164 ECONOMICFLUCTUATIONS
15 months applies to cash loans of this size which are used
formiscellaneouspurposes.Instalment"modernization
loans" (credit extended for materials and services to be used
in connection with repairs, alterations or improvements of
urban or rural real property) are subject to an 18-month
maturity restriction if the deferred balance does not exceed
$1000. Special repayment conditions are allowed on credit
extended to farmers or others whose income is seasonal, and
in arrangemçnts intended to encourage off-seasonal purchases
of seasonal goods. Compliance with the regulations is en-
forced by subjecting contr.aventions to severe penalties.6
As is usually the case with credit control, it is easier to
check an expansion and force a contraction than to arrest
a contraction and induce an expansion. The two cases are not
strictly symmetrical. If it should become desirable to expand
credit again, the first thing to do would be, of course, to re-
move the regulations on down payment percentage and con-
tract length. But a maximum down payment percentage and
a minimum maturity cannot be enforced as effectively as a
minimum down payment and a maximum maturity. It is true
that the writing of contracts with a higher than maximum
down payment percentage and shorter than minimum
maturity could be effectively prevented by declaring them
unenforceable. But the debtor could not well be denied the
right to repay his debt more quickly than stipulated in the
contract,7 and the right to grant or to refuse a loan cannot
The Executive Order declares contracts that violate any provision of the
regulation to be unenforceable, except in regard to provisions "designated
as being for administrative purposes" (section 2,d). This provision would
probably be more effective than the imposition of penalties. Regulation W
declares, however, that "pending an opportunity for the Board to observe
this regulation in operation ...allof the provisions of this regulation are
designated ....asbeing for administrative purposes ..." (section7).
7Consumersdo not generally seek to make the cash down payment as small
as possible and to repay their debt as slowly as possible. In many cases they
try to keep their debts as low, and to repay them as quickly, as they con-
veniently can. Hence we cannot be sure that all buyers would accept easy
terms with respect to down payment and maturity if they were offered. In
this respect the situation is different from that of price and price control,
of which the interest cost of a loan and its regulation are a special case:
other things being equal, the consumer will accept the lowest price offer.CONTROL OF CREDIT i65
be denied to the lender; be cannot well be forced to lend
at standard terms to everybody, as a retailer can be forced
to sell to everybody who is willing to pay the price. Hence
the volume of credit cannot be forced up against the wishes
of the parties concerned by enforcing liberal terms, while it
can be forced down by enforcing severe terms.
If lenders are reluctant to expand credit to meet the full
demand for it, resort may be had to other stimulating meas-
ures, such as credit insurance by government agencies along
the lines followed by the Federal Housing Administration,
or outright competitive financing operations, intended to
force down terms and charges, by government agencies such
as the Electric Home and Farm Authority.8
PURPOSE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROL
In considering the objectives and effectiveness of instalment
credit control it is well to distinguish between, on the one
hand, the ups and downs of ordinary peacetime business
cycles, and, on the other hand, periods of booms or inflations
fed by government spending for defense or war purposes,
and the violent reaction thereto in a postwar slump. It may
be argued that the difference between these two types of
conditions is essentially one of degree. But it is at any rate
sufficiently great a difference to warrant separate considera-
tion.
Let us first discuss the second problem, exemplified by
the present situation. In spite of the fact that the stakes
and dangers are much greater than in the other case, it is
in many respects the simpler and mOre clear-cut problem of
the two.
In the present situation, which imperatively demands a
decrease of that section of civilian consumption which corn-
8Theoperations of these agencies have been described, and the value and
effect of their activities appraised, in National Bureau of Economic Research
(Financial Research Program), Government Agencies of Consumer Instalment
Credit., by Joseph D. Coppock (1940).i66 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
petes withdefenserequirements, a policy of enforced con-
traction of instalment credit offers distinct advantages.9 Such
a policy may be said to have three objectives.
The first objective is a conservation of materials, equip-
ment, skilled labor and managerial ability that are needed
for the defense effort. This necessitates a retrenchment of
civilian demand especially for durable goods, such as auto-
mobiles, refrigerators, washing machines, other electric ap-
pliances—precisely the commodities that are bought on
instalment credit. Hence a contraction of the volume of new
credits, if effective, would make itself felt at the exact point
where it is needed.
A second objective of a contraction policy at present is to
check inflation by restraining the rise in consumer purchas-
ing power and demand in general. Such a restraining in-
fluence would be provided by .a reduction in outstanding
instalment credit. It should be noted that outstandings will
be influenced in the downward direction not only if the
volume of new credits is reduced but also, independently of
any influence on new, credits, if the credit period is shortened
and consumers are forced to repay their instalment debts
more rapidly.
The third objective to be achieved by a contraction of in-
stalment credit in the present emergency is a deferment of
consumer demand to the postwar period. After the end of the
war, when armament production is rapidly curtailed, a quick
revival of consumer demand for durable goods will facilitate
the necessary readjustment of manufacturing industry. This
revival of consumer demand will be aided by the use of in-
stalment credit and by the relaxation of the restrictions that
are imposed now.
In the present situation the most important of these three
aspects is obviously the second one mentioned, the check on
9The exact timing of such a policy may be open to doubt. But at this writ-
ing (Autumn 1941) it is fairly generally agreed that the time has come for
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inflation. In view of the fact that as a result of defense ex-
penditure incomes are rapidly rising, and that rising prices
and growing scarcities are generally and increasingly antici-
p.ated by the public, a tightening of credit terms, even a more
drastic one than that decreed so far (which, by the way, is
quite severe as compared with prevailing standards), will
hardly bring about a sufficient check on civilian demand. The
necessary curtailment of durable consumer goods production
must therefore be effected by the scarcity and rationing of
raw materials, and by the direct imposition of production
quotas. This curtailment of output will automatically bring
about a contraction of new instalment credits and out-
standings, and will create a backlog and a deferment of
consumer demand. Therefore, with respect to the first and
third objectives listed above, a forced contraction of instal-
ment credit cannot do more than is achieved by direct
measures.
But the tightening of terms will have a certain anti-
inflationary effect, even if it cannot depress total sales or
credit sales below the level determined by scarcities and ra-
tioning, and possibly by rising prices. Not only will repay-
ments be increased, and thereby outstandings reduced, when
consumers are forced by shorter maturities to repay their
debts more quickly than they would otherwise, but the in-
creased down payment percentage will result in a decrease in
new credits even if the number of articles sold on credit re-
mains unchanged.
To give an idea of the possible effect of the present regu-
lations in one important field of instalment financing, we
compare in Chart XIV the actual movement of new-auto-
mobile outstandings, new credits, repayments and net credit
change, from July 1940 through September 1941, with what
these four magnitudes would have been if all cars had been
financed according to the new regulations during this period
and the preceding 18 months. The difference between the
two curves represents the effect that this earlier imposition168 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
CHART XIV
ESTIMATED SERIES ON INSTALMENT FINANCING OF NEW PASSENGER
AUTOMOBILES, 1940—41, AND CORRESPONDING SERIES UNDER THE
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of the new minimum terms would have had.'° The net anti-
inflationary effect is best indicated by the difference between
the two curves of net credit change, for this difference shows
how much the purchasing power of the credit users would
have been curtailed." While such a curtailment of con-
sumer purchasing power and expenditure will, in principle,
be a welcome supplement to the effects of other anti-infla-
tionary measures it will hardly be a factor of importance un-
less terms are tightened much more severely.
We may turn now to the problems of instalment credit
control as a means of mitigating the ups and downs of
ordinary peacetime business cycles. The methods of control
will be the same as in the problem just discussed; the ma-
chinery set up and the experience gained in the present
emergency will be applicable also for peacetime purposes.
An intense cyclical boom that leads the economic system
up to full employment and threatens to bring about price
inflation would in many respects be similar to the present
war boom. During such an upswing the anti-inflationary,
damping effect of a contraction of instalment credit would be
'°The hypothetical curves were derived on the assumption, first, that the
number of car sales financed would have remained unchanged, and second,
that all credits would have been extended according to the new regulations.
Both assumptions entail a certain understatement of the effectthat the
earlier introduction of the stiffer terms would have had: the number of cars
sold on credit would have been reduced (although probably not much); and
the actual above.standard contracts (more than 33 1/3 percent down payment
and less than 18 months maturity) would presumably have been unaffected.
(This maturity regulation was subsequently amended; see p.163 above.)
It is likely that this effect will be quantitatively less in the future, be-
cause the volume of credit will shrink when the production and sales of
durable goods are reduced by direct curbs on output.
FOOTNOTE TO CHART xiv—Based on National Bureau estimates, derived from
data in publications and releases of the U. S. Department of Commerce (Bureau
ofthe Census and Bureau ofForeign and Domestic Commerce) and
from information supplied by the Automobile Manufacturers Association and
by a large automobile finance company. In deriving the hypothetical series
it was assumed that from February 1939 (18 months—the stipulated contract
maturity—before the beginning of the present series) all cars were financed in
accordance with Regulation W (amended as of December 1, 1941), issued by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Nc? adjustment has been
made for seasonal variations. (In 1942 maturity was changed to 15 months.)170 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
very welcome. And, similarly, during the downswing of the
cycle a relaxation of the restrictions imposed in the boom
would tend to stimulate consumer expenditure and to re-
lieve the depression in economic activity.
Since the last war, however, that is, during the period in
which consumer instalment credit has become an important
factor, business cycles have not been of that type. At least
during the decade after 1929, upswings were not carried close
to full employment, and at no time was there a danger of
a general price rise resulting from rising demand pressing
against inexpansible supply. With respect to the prosperity
period culminating in 1929 expert opinion is sharply divided
on the question whether it would have been wise to force
a contraction of instalment credit. Some economists argue
that a restrictive policy in the field of instalment credit
(and elsewhere) would have made the following depression
milder, although it might have precipitated it earlier. Many
others, probably the majority of experts, are inclined to be-
lieve that such a policy would have needlessly interrupted
the upswing without making the coming reaction milder.12
With respect to the upswing that reached its highest point
in 1937 the division of opinion is less pronounced. In 1937
the economy was undoubtedly much farther away from full
employment than in 1929; therefore the case for a restrictive
credit policy during the course of the 1934-37 upswing is
much weaker, and fewer economists would have recom-
mended it at that time or would now, in the light of subse-
quent developments, regard it as having been wise.
On the other hand, there is fairly general agreement that
in a depression, when consumer demand and output shrink
and prices sag, an expansive policy in the field of instalment
credit is desirable. The trouble is that there is not much
scope for a liberalization of terms in a depression if they
have not been tightened during the preceding upswing.
12Thesetwo schools of thought were discussed in Chapter 5, and some refer-
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Economic developments during the period in question (1930-
40) have brought home to economists the essential limita-
tions of credit control, whether it be control of credit in
general or of instalment credit in particular. Credit control
operates as a brake rather than an accelerator. You can al-
ways stop an acceleration by putting on the brakes, but a
deceleration can be counteracted by means of the brakes
only if they have been applied before and can now be re-
leased. Moreover, even releasing the brakes will not help
very much if the speed has been greatly reduced, unless
the road goes down hill, which is scarcely the case in severe
depressions; thus the response of demand to a removal of
supply restrictions may be quite sluggish in a depression. It
may be repeated that the present situation, dominated by
the war effort, offers a splendid opportunity to put on the
brakes.
We have seen in earlier chapters that there is not much
evidence for the view that a tightening of the supply of
credit has been a very important factor in bringing about
such contractions as occurred during the period under con-
sideration. A decrease in demand seems to have been the
chief responsible factor.'3 But there may have been some
tightening of supply, brought about by a more rigorous ex-
amination of applications rather than by a visible hardening
of credit terms. To the extent that this could be prevented
from occurring in depressions the situation would be relieved.
But even the complete elimination of cyclical fluctuations
in supply would in no way be sufficient to iron out cyclical
fluctuations in new credits and outstandings. If demand
fluctuates much with the cycle—as it clearly does—there
would be cycles in credit even if supply conditions were
perfectly stable. Thus the question arises whether it would
be possible not merely to stabilize supply conditions but
to make them move against the cycle, that is, make supply
13Thisconclusion is in accord with the recent trend of thought in credit
theory in general, in which more and more stress is being laid on demand
as against supply factors, and their fluctuations.172 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
conditions more liberal in depressions, when demand falls
off, and tighten them when demand expands, in such a way
as to counteract the fluctuations emanating from the demand
side. It goes without saying that by "supply conditions" is
meant not only the finance charge but also the down pay-
ment percentage and, even more, the length of contract..
Supposing it were feasible to liberalize terms markedly
in depression years—how effective would such a policy be
in preventing cyclical drops in the volume of credit? It was
pointed out in Chapter 4 that the short-run elasticity of de-
mand is probably not great with respect to changes in the
annual percentage rate of charge. On the other hand, it is
likely that with respect to down payment percentage and
contract length the situation is different. By lengthening the
debt period and reducing the down payment percentage, po-
tential demand in lower-income levels may conceivably be
tapped for the consumption of durable goods.
Two effects must be distinguished: first, the effect on the
volume of credit sales, and hence on the flow of new credits
and the amount of outstandings;14 second, what might be
called the direct effect on outstandings, regardless of whether
there is a change in credit sales or in new credits. Even if a
liberalization of lending, with respect to down payment per-
centage and contract length, did not induce an expansion of
sales, there would still result an expansion in outstanding
credit. This effect would be reinforced if it were possible to
refinance and rewrite many existing contracts on the basis of
longer maturities, thus, as it were, lengthening the credit
period retroactively, applying the longer maturities to out-
standing contracts too instead of only to new ones.
It is unfortunately impossible to tell in advance how ef-
fective a given policy of cyclical change in credit terms would
be in influencing the volume of sales and new credits, for
we know very little about the short-run elasticity of demand
14A change in the down payment percentage may change new credits with-
out changing sales.CONTROL OF CREDIT 173
for durable consumer goods with respect to terms of credit.15
But whether substantial or negligible, the influence would
certainly be in the right direction, and hence such a policy
would be worth a trial. It may be worth adding that the
persuasive power of an easing of terms will be greater if it
is generally known that the liberal terms will last only
temporarily. Hence the liberalization would be more effec-
tive if the cyclical nature of credit policy were announced in
advance.
It is possible to say more about the direct effect on out-
standings, mentioned above. Even if credit sales were quite
unresponsive to changes in credit terms, outstandings would
be influenced, if on the unchanged volume of sales the down
payment percentage were reduced and the credit period
lengthened. To be sure, it cannot be assumed that all buyers
would accept the easier terms. Some of them might think it
a postulate of sound finance to keep their debt as low as
possible in bad times, and might refuse to take advantage of
lower down payment percentages; and for similar reasons
some debtors might not be inclined to accept a lengthening
of the loan period on outstanding debts. But it seems plausi-
ble that there would be a large proportion who would be
willing to take advantage of an opportunity to spread out
the period of repayment. Psychologically the offer of a longer
credit period could be made much more tempting if itwere
accompanied by a reduction of the interest equivalent of the
15Thiswill be found less surprising if it is remembered that the situation
is not much better in the far more discussed problem of the elasticity of
demand for durable goods with respect to the price of these goods. It is stilt
a moot question whether a more flexible price policy, especially price reduc-
tions in depression years, would tend to stabilize the production and sale of
automobiles. See, for example, The Dynamics of Automobile Demand (pub-
lished by General Motors Corporation, 1939), especially the contribution by
C. F. Roos and V. v. Szeliski and the summary by S. M. DuBrul. See also
the controversy to which this study has given rise: W. I. King, "Can Pro-
duction of Automobiles be Stabilized by Making their Prices Flexible?," fol-
lowed by an answer from C. F. Roos and V. v. Szeliski, a rejoinder and a
second reply (Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 34, De-
cember 1939).174 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS
finance charge, so that the sum total of the instalment
amounts would not rise, or would rise only a little.16
What could be achieved by such a policy can be judged
from a rough calculation of the way in which automobile
credit outstandings would have been affected by a hypotheti-
cal policy of maturity changes in 1929 and later. It is as-
sumed that sales would not have changed at all from the
actually reported level. The outstanding amount of automo-
bile paper reached a high of 1,456 million dollars in August
1929 and fell 80 percent to a low of 293 million in March
1933. During this period the average maturity of such paper
was about 13 months. Suppose finance companies had started
to increase their maturities late in 1929, and by the end
of 1930 had succeeded in raising the average contract length
to 24 months. (This is a rather extreme assumption, and
it is probably too optimistic to assume that such a drastic
lengthening in the average maturity could be achieved.) The
trough would then have been reached a few months later
than it was, and would have been only about 50 percent lower
than the 1929 peak instead of 80 percent, about 733 million
dollars instead of 293 million. The finance companies could
have started to shorten maturities later in 1933, and by the
middle of 1934 they might have been back at a 13-month
basis. By the middle of 1935 outstandings would then have
returned to the actually reported figure.
This policy would have effected a strengthening of con-
sumer purchasing power over the depression years 1930-33
to the extent of about 440 million dollars (the amount by
which outstandings would have been raised at the trough). It
is true that, compared with total consumer expenditure,
this is not a large sum if distributed over two or three years.
Moreover, it constitutes a transfer from later years rather
than a net addition.'7 It must not be forgotten, however,
16Thisseems plausible in spite of the statement, made above, that changes
of a few percent in the rate of charge would be a factor of negligible im-
portance in determining the volume of credit sales.
17Jfthe drop from 1929 to 1933 would have been less, but the level in 1935
the same, the rise from 1933 to 1935 would have been less.CONTROL OF CREDIT 175
that the strengthening of consumer purchasing power and
expenditure in the depression years would have had favorable
indirect effects, that for the purposes of this calculation
new credits were assumed to remain unchanged, and that
only automobile credit was considered.
We have seen in Chapter 5 that consumer instalment credit
is not a cyclical factor of the very first importance. Even
if cyclical fluctuations in instalment credit were entirely
eliminated, the business cycle would stillexist. But the
same could be said of many other factors and measures, if
each were considered in isolation. There are no simple
measures regulating mildly certain sections of economic ac-
tivity that would altogether eliminate, or drastically miti-
gate, economic fluctuations. But concerted action in many
fields at the, same time will havenoticeable stabilizing
effect, and in such a system of measures the cyclical control
of consumer instalment credit should find an important
place..4-